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A Policy Analysis of the Development of Elite Swimming in 
China between 2000 and 2012: A National Team Perspective 
 
Abstract 
 
This article attempts to analyze underlying policy factors behind China’s 
recent recovery in elite swimming in particular its success in the London 
Olympiad through the application of the multiple streams framework in general 
and its concept of policy windows in particular. The poor performance at the 
2000 Sydney Olympic Games was a ‘wake-up call’, which in conjunction with 
Beijing’s successful Olympic bid in 2001, opened policy windows prompting 
large-scale review and reform from which a broad range of ‘heavyweight’ 
policy actions were introduced and implemented. However, the road to recent 
success has been ‘bumpy’ during which there were other key events that 
have left an indelible imprint on Chinese swimming. Therefore, the multiple 
streams framework in general and the concept of policy windows in particular 
afford a theoretical gateway to structure policy analysis of elite swimming in 
China. Moreover, as a Western-derived theory the application of which to a 
sports context has been very sporadic, of the multiple streams framework is 
evaluated regarding its applicability, or ‘compatibility’. Five semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders were conducted, accompanied by 
comprehensive document analysis of official documents and website 
information of associated sports governing bodies and associations, and 
influential domestic and foreign media. 
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Introduction 
 
Swimming1 in China has a relatively long history. As early as 1936, the then 
Nationalist Government sent a delegation including two swimmers to the 
Berlin Olympic Games.2 In the 1950s, Chinese swimmers broke the world 
record for the men’s breaststroke five times. 3 At Barcelona 1992, China’s 
swimming achieved a breakthrough as the ‘five golden flowers’4  won four 
gold medals. However, because of drug scandals in the mid-1990s, Chinese 
swimming suffered a sharp decline and reached its nadir at Sydney 2000, 
winning no medal.5 The team gradually rebounded at Athens 2004 and Beijing 
2008, and finally reached a new high at London 2012, where Chinese 
swimmers won five gold medals and ranked second in the swimming-specific 
gold medal table. Table 1 presents a summary of China’s performance at the 
six most recent Olympic Games, which is characterized as a U-shaped curve.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
This article focuses on a policy analysis of factors behind Chinese elite 
swimmers’ recent success on the international stage. A broad range of policy 
measures – covering areas ranging from organizational structure, financial 
support, talent identification and athlete development, to coaching, training 
regimes, competition opportunities, and more importantly, anti-doping – have 
had a profound impact on China’s recovery and revival in elite swimming 
during this 12 year period and beyond. These measures, which have largely 
formed the key elements of China’s current elite swimming system, were 
propelled by a succession of pivotal events (most notably poor performances 
at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games and the 2007 Melbourne World 
Championships) and the landmark milestone of Beijing’s successful bid to 
host the 2008 Olympic Games in 2001. These events have resonated strongly 
with the concept of ‘policy windows’ within Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams 
framework6. The multiple streams framework in general and its concept of 
policy windows in particular serve as a heuristic device for the policy analysis 
in this article, particularly with respect to policy making. Despite its limited 
application to elite sport policy thus far, the framework provides this article 
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with a highly illuminating theoretical gateway. In addition to the analytical 
function, this article also provides an exploratory evaluation of this theoretical 
framework and its concept of policy windows in the area of elite sport in a 
country which, in many aspects, contrasts strikingly with the birth country of 
the framework – the United States. This article concludes by proffering some 
context-specific localizations, adaptations, and theoretical developments of 
the concept of policy windows.  
 
Theoretical Framework: The Multiple Streams Framework and the 
Concept of Policy Windows  
 
The multiple streams framework, derived from the ‘garbage can’ model,7 is 
characterized by its emphasis on ‘the ambiguity, complexity and degree of 
residual randomness in policy-making in marked contrast to the dominant 
assumptions of actor rationality’. 8  Instead of rationality, multiple streams 
assume that public policy is predicated on a ‘temporal order’.9 The framework 
is a powerful analytical tool for explaining policy generation under conditions 
of ambiguity. A policy system comprises three largely separate streams: the 
problem stream, policy stream, and the political stream. These three streams, 
in addition to policy windows and policy entrepreneurs, are the five structural 
elements of the multiple streams framework.10   
 
(1) The problem stream refers to issues that governments address and plan to 
resolve through three sources: focusing events (most notably crises; e.g., 
poor Olympic performance), indicators of the changing scale of a problem 
(statistics on obesity rates), and feedback on current policies.  
 
(2) The policy stream is described as a ‘primeval soup’ within which ‘ideas, 
backed by particular policy communities, float around’ 11  and vie for 
acceptance by policy makers. In brief, there are two criteria for determining 
whether ideas survive: technical feasibility and value acceptability. Notably, 
in many cases, policy change and policies are not static. Travis and 
Zahariadis (2002) adopted an incrementalist approach to the multiple streams 
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model, arguing that the adoption and development of policies can be gradual 
and some policies tend to be enduring.12  
 
(3) The political stream primarily consists of three elements: the national 
mood, organized political forces such as party ideology and interest groups, 
and government.   
 
Normally, the three streams are largely independent of each other. However, 
at critical junctures, the problem, policy, and political streams are joined. 
These moments are termed ‘policy windows’ – representing ‘an opportunity 
for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to 
their special problems.’13 There are two types of policy windows: ‘problem and 
political windows.’14 More precisely, policy windows can be opened by either 
compelling problems or events in political streams.  
    Furthermore, policy windows can be further reified. Exworthy and Powell 
(2004)15 introduced the concepts of ‘big windows’ at the national level and 
‘little windows’ at the local level. A slight ‘localization’ is necessary for this 
article, in which ‘big windows’ refer to events beyond elite swimming per se 
(e.g., prominent political and economic events in China and events affecting 
the entire elite sports scene in China), whereas ‘little windows’ are ‘swimming-
specific windows’. In addition, policy windows can also be categorized 
according to their predictability, which has been most systematically 
discussed by Howlett (1998)16 in analyzing federal agenda-setting in Canada. 
Howlett (1998)17 argued that there is a predictable–unpredictable distinction 
regarding policy windows, identifying four types of policy windows: routine, 
discretionary, spillover, and random. There is a certain degree of predictability 
of policy windows in the area of elite sport policy, most notably evidenced in 
the performance pressure covering each 4-year Olympic cycle and the policy 
review and evaluation after each major sporting event, particularly the 
Olympic Games and, to a lesser extent, the World Championships.  
    Coupling the three streams requires not only policy windows but also a 
promoter – a policy entrepreneur. Policy entrepreneurs are defined as 
‘advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, 
money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain …’. 18 
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Considering the five elements together, the successful launch of a policy 
change is the result of opening a policy window in the interplay of streams: 
‘Solutions which have been floating around become attached and coupled to 
a problem and policy entrepreneurs seize the opportunity to change the 
decision agenda’19 (Figure 1).  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
The multiple streams framework has been successfully applied across a wide 
range of policy areas, particularly in Western contexts, despite a dearth of 
exploratory research in relation to sport policy (the limited sport-related 
research involves New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom 20 ). 
Regarding country contexts, the multiple streams framework has seldom been 
applied to non-Western contexts in general or to China in particular. Zhu 
(2008)21 is one of the few scholars to apply this framework in China to the 
detention and repatriation system. His research observed that the essential 
elements of the multiple streams framework in particular the concept of ‘policy 
windows’ are reasonably compatible with China’s system, despite the 
necessity of the possibility of achieving politically feasible but technically 
‘infeasible’ policies in China22. In summary, the multiple streams framework in 
general and the concept of policy windows in particular serve as a heuristic 
device for guiding data collection and provides a theoretical gateway to 
structure the policy analysis of elite swimming in China. 
 
Research Methods 
 
This article draws on empirical findings derived from both semi-structured 
interviews and qualitative content analysis of documents. First, five semi-
structured interviews were conducted in China with major stakeholders in elite 
sport in general and elite swimming in particular: two retired senior officials of 
the General Administration of Sport of China (GAS), a senior official of the 
National Aquatics Management Centre – the current team leader of the 
National Swimming Team, a senior coach of the National Team, and one of 
the most renowned sports scholars in China. The interviews were conducted 
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in 2013, as part of a wider study focusing on a comparative analysis of sport 
policy processes between China and the United Kingdom. Interviewees were 
identified according to their seniority, relevance, and availability. Therefore, 
changes after 2013 were not included. Reams of data were gathered from 
these interviews, each lasting between 50 minutes and 2 hours. The interview 
questions encompassed a wide range of policy areas of elite swimming 
development in China. The interviews were recorded digitally and conducted 
in Mandarin Chinese by the author. A copy of the transcripts in Chinese was 
provided to each interviewee for accuracy verification and error correction. To 
ensure the high-quality of translation, the transcripts were back translated to 
detect and correct linguistic inconsistencies before they were subjected to 
formal coding and analysis.  
    The interviews were accompanied by comprehensive document analysis 
derived from official documents and website information of associated sports 
governing bodies most notably GAS, Chinese Olympic Committee, National 
Aquatics Management Centre, Chinese Swimming Association (CSA), and 
Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA), in combination with influential 
Chinese and international media such as China Central Television, Xinhuanet, 
People.com.cn, iFeng and the Daily Telegraph.  
    This article focuses on 2000–2012 for four reasons. First, China’s poor 
performance at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games was a watershed in the 
development of elite swimming in China, from which many ‘revolutionary’ 
approaches have been adopted and the current structure of the National 
Swimming Team was established. This period also largely coincided with 
Beijing’s successful bid in July 2001 to host the 2008 Olympic Games, which 
had a marked and irreversible impact on elite swimming in China. Second, 
from a theoretical perspective, 2000 and 2001 formed two of the most 
consequential ‘policy windows’ in the policy development of elite swimming in 
the country, one being a problem window and the other a political window. 
Third, this 12-year period effectively corresponds with the main theme of 
‘recovery’ and revival’ of this article, thus warranting particular focus. Fourth, 
data that are more substantial are available from all three sources – 
interviews, policy documents, and, most notably, website information for 
2000–2012. Data prior to 2000 were more limited and less systematic. 
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However, some information regarding Chinese swimming in the 1990s is 
mentioned for providing background information and/or making a comparison. 
The most notable example is China’s doping history and anti-doping policy 
trajectory.  
    Another issue worthy of clarifying is the primacy given to the national team 
level and the concomitant data collection focused on the national team. This 
relative ‘exclusion’ of provincial perspectives is due to (1) the origin of this 
article – a wider study focusing on a comparative analysis of sport policy 
processes between China and the United Kingdom at the national level; and 
(2) the unavailability of most potential interviewees at the provincial team level 
because of 2013 being a National Games year when different provinces were 
busy preparing for the event. Recent interview requests to them were in most 
cases rejected because of their identification of policy as a sensitive issue and 
their concern about disclosing valuable information to rival provinces. By 
comparison, interviewees at the national level tended to be more willing to 
share information.  
 
An Analysis of Key Policy Factors 
 
Elevated Policy, Financial and Scientific Support 
 
Swimming in China has been a beneficiary of the Chinese government’s 
policy support and the government’s concomitant financial and scientific 
support. The 119 Project, launched in the early 2000s, was a clear 
manifestation of deliberate policy support from GAS for China’s non-traditional 
sports including swimming. The 119 Project, advanced by the then Director of 
GAS – Weimin Yuan, was prompted by the dissatisfaction of the narrow range 
of sources of (gold) medals for China at Sydney 2000 and the poor 
performance in athletics, swimming, and other water sports 23. In Sydney, 
despite China’s notable gold medal increase and the achievement of 
overtaking Germany as the world’s top-third sports power, China won only 
one gold medal in athletics and failed to win any medal in swimming, rowing, 
sailing, or canoeing. The total gold medals from these sports at a single 
Olympic Games was 119, accounting for more than one-third of the total gold 
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medals available. However, China’s market share was extremely limited, 
which was perceived as incommensurate with China’s pursuit of being a 
major sports nation. Coupled with the increasing quest for more Olympic gold 
medals from broader sources derived from Beijing’s successful Olympic bid in 
2001, the 119 Project, which aimed at improving China’s Olympic 
performance in athletics, swimming, canoeing, rowing, and sailing, was 
officially implemented in the early 2000s. From the perspective of the multiple 
streams framework, poor performance at Sydney 2000 and Beijing’s 
acquisition of the right to host the Olympic Games in 2001 formed two 
significant policy windows prompting policy changes for elite swimming in 
China, with the former being a swimming-specific window as well as a 
problem, while the latter more general in both political and sporting senses. 
119 Project was the most landmark product in the policy stream. Regarding 
the 119 Project, designated sports including swimming obtained substantial 
financial, scientific and other forms of support. In addition, the National Team 
regime was reformed, and foreign communication, including the recruitment of 
world leading swimming coaches and overseas training, from small- to large-
scale, was markedly enhanced following this fundamental project, which 
elevated the strategic profile of swimming in the Chinese elite sports scene. 
Akin to athletics, swimming is officially identified as a foundation and lagging 
sport in China.24  
    Substantial government policy and financial support for elite sport in 
general and swimming in particular needs to be understood within the 
wider context of the one-party system and the pro-Olympic (gold) 
medal success national mood, which is illustrated by the political 
stream of Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams framework. There is a 
high degree of overlap between party ideology and government in the 
one-party system in China. The CCP represents and monopolizes 
government actions in China. Concerning the national mood, it is 
strongly shaped and influenced by the CCP and the government. A 
salient example was the high degree of enthusiasm for the staging of 
the Olympic Games and Olympic medal success in China. Although 
there were criticisms of the cost of staging the Olympic Games and of 
the Olympic-gold-medal-only philosophy as well as of some specific 
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issues such as the recruitment and training of child athletes, they were 
only expressed by a limited group of people and had a limited impact 
on national mood.  
    The 119 Project has been instrumental in further enhancing China’s 
Olympic gold medal performance and eventually contributing to China’s rise 
as a superpower on the Summer Olympic stage. As shown in Table 2, China’s 
sources of gold and other medals increased dramatically since Athens 2004, 
the first Olympic Games after the implementation of the 119 Project.  China 
won four gold medals in 119 sports at both Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008 as 
opposed to one in Sydney. China achieved gold medal breakthroughs in 
canoeing in 2004 and in rowing and sailing in 2012. Athletics also welcomed 
its best ever performance in 2004 with two gold medals. Chinese swimming’s 
Olympic gold medal productivity soon recovered and its competitiveness 
reached a record high after Beijing 2008.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
The 119 Project was developed as a result of both the dissatisfaction with 
certain sports performances at Sydney 2000 and increased gold medal 
expectation and pressure for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. This 
corresponded with China’s fundamental Olympic strategy shift from 
‘shortening the battle line and emphasize the focus’ prior to the 2000s, to 
‘seeking new sources of Olympic gold medals’ in the 2000s’, as specified in 
The Outline of the Strategic Olympic Glory Plan: 2001–2010. 25  The 119 
Project provided a golden opportunity for the development of many non-
traditional sports in China and laid a solid foundation for the recovery and 
revival of Chinese swimming where the impact of the project tends to be the 
most profound and enduring.  
    The holistic support derived from the 119 Project is evidenced in funding 
and science. Annual GAS funds allocated to the National Water Sports 
Management Centre (responsible for rowing, sailing, and canoeing) doubled 
in 2001 compared with 2000, reaching CN¥20 million yuan (approximately 
£1.3 million then). In addition, 3 million yuan was directed to equipment 
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purchase and 1 million for international competition visits26. Similar to rowing, 
sailing, and canoeing, swimming received substantial funds in the 2000s.   
    State funds constitute the most crucial financial source for the Aquatics 
Management Centre and the CSA. The annual government investment in the 
National Swimming Team was approximately CN¥13 million yuan for the 
London Olympiad. 27  GAS is in charge of allocating funds to all sports 
including swimming, according to the number of administrative appointments. 
    In recent years, swimming has attracted substantial commercial money, 
particularly in the Olympic year (e.g., from Audi, Midea and Ping An). 28 
However, state funds are largely sufficient and hence there has always been 
a surplus of commercial money. The balance of the Aquatics Management 
Centre account has reached CN¥100 million and the annual tax is more than 
CN¥10 million.29 A main area in which commercial investment makes a great 
contribution is the overseas training of the National Team, where commercial 
sponsoring money was approximately 10 million CNY each year at the 
London Olympiad, accounting for 50% of the total expenditure. 30 Notably, 
sponsorship and commercial money are strictly controlled by the Economic 
Department of GAS,31 which, instead of the Aquatics Management Centre 
and the National Swimming Team, is the sole recipient of the money and 
regulates its use. Commercial money can be used only for training. This 
demonstrates the hierarchical relationship between GAS and the Aquatics 
Management Centre as well as the latter’s financial dependence on the 
former.  
    Scientific support was another illustration of increased governmental 
support for 119 Project sports including swimming. GAS and the China 
Institute of Sport Science send a specialized team including top sports 
medical experts from leading comprehensive and sports universities in China 
to the National Team training centre and the scientific team stays with the 
team to provide daily support. Key athletes, particularly those who have a 
chance of winning gold medals at the Olympic Games and FINA World 
Championships, receive additional care. 32  They are accompanied by 
‘bespoke’ scientific and medical teams and personal masseurs.33 These are 
notable examples of a series of scientific support from GAS for swimming 
since the Beijing Olympiad.  
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Centralization: An Increasingly National Governing Body-Led Approach  
 
Before 2000, there had been no regular National Swimming Team, only a 
loose ‘federalized’ team.34 Provincial teams were often reluctant to send top 
athletes to the National Team because it conflicted with their provincial 
interests and the National Team was hence largely depleted. 35  Provincial 
teams provided more substantial benefits including financial rewards to 
swimmers in order to enhance performance at the National Games, thus 
influencing athletes’ preferences.36 The training of elite swimmers, including 
those representing China, relied overwhelmingly on provincial teams. 
However, the lack of resource concentration was proven detrimental to the 
performance of the National Team at major competitions. The poor 
performance at Sydney 2000 was a turning point (policy window) resulting in a 
sea change in the national team structure. The national team structure and 
training regime for the National Team swimmers were identified a key problem 
(problem stream). Consequently, the event-oriented transitional National 
Team system was established, but only before major events such as the 
Olympic Games, the FINA World Championships, and the Asian Games did 
elite swimmers from different provinces congregate in Beijing and undertake 
intensive training for a short period. Finally, a stable and regular National 
Team was established after the 2002 Busan Asian Games, following the 119 
Project and led by new Director and Vice Director of the Aquatics 
Management Centre. The average annual training time for swimmers on the 
National Team is approximately 340 days. 37  These were effective policy 
solutions identified and adopted in response to the aforementioned problems. 
The training base of GAS is the headquarters for the National Swimming 
Team. At the London Olympiad, the size of the National Team, including 
preeminent reserve athletes, remained between 100 and 200 swimmers.  
    Currently, elite swimming in China is characterized by a highly centralized 
organizational structure in which national governing bodies dominate and 
provincial teams are largely cooperative with national team requirements, 
instead of the previously prevalent national–provincial tension. The Aquatics 
Management Centre, subordinate to GAS, is the highest swimming-specific 
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organ of state administration.38 With respect to fundamental issues and basic 
principles and directions, GAS holds the decision-making power, whereas the 
Aquatics Management Centre acts as a policy implementer. However, the 
Aquatics Management Centre is highly autonomous in addressing swimming-
related issues as long as it conforms to the fundamental principles of GAS.  
    The National Team focuses on the management and operation of the 
athletes, coaches, and other staff members of the National Team. The 
overriding interests inside the policy community are to pursue Olympic glory 
and elite sport success. According to the team leader of the National 
Swimming Team, the decision-making process is highly hierarchical.  
      Key decision makers mainly come from the National Team Committee  
      and the Swimming Department of the Aquatics Management Centre.  
      The current director of the Team Committee is also the secretary of the  
      Aquatics Management Centre. He is a key decision maker, working  
      with the team leader and the head coach of the National Team  
      and so on. In general, decision making involves four to five people. They  
      form the core of the policy making community. Olympic gold medal  
      coaches join the decision making if it concerns the National Team. When  
      it comes to non-National team issues such as competition schedules, the  
      Swimming Department takes the responsibility … Athletes are seldom  
      involved in the policy-making process. There is no athlete committee  
      inside the Aquatics Management Centre or the Swimming Department.  
      The exclusion of athletes from the policy making process helps enhance  
      the efficiency of policy implementation. … Provincial teams regularly  
      provide suggestions and feedback to the Management Centre, and the  
      National Team, and the Management Centre and the Swimming  
      Department often exchange opinions with provincial teams regarding  
      issues such as competition schedules and the method for Olympic  
      squad selection. But the leaders of the Management Centre, the  
      Swimming Department and the National Team make the final decisions.39   
  
The CSA, founded in 1956, is nominally a non-governmental organization.40 It 
represents Chinese swimming and is a FINA member.41 However, the CSA 
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follows the will and requirements of GAS and the Aquatics Management 
Centre.   
    At the regional level, swimming-related management centres and 
departments are affiliated with regional sports bureaus or administrations and 
hence ‘belong’ to regional governments. In principle, the Chinese Aquatics 
Management Centre does not govern provincial aquatics management 
centres and the relationship is in the form of ‘professional guidance’ and 
‘mentoring.’42 However, there are many cases where provincial teams serve 
the needs of the National Team particularly in relation to fundamental polices 
such as the Olympic Glory Plan.43  
 
An Improved National–Provincial Relationship: ‘Big National Team’ and 
the National Team-Led Collective Training for Reserve Swimmers 
 
Swimming has been an illustrative example of the improved national–
provincial relationship and inter-provincial cooperation. This increasingly 
compliant, or rather, cooperative national/provincial relationship was propelled 
by both (1) the centralized structure in which the national government and 
national team obtain more substantial resources and power to demand lower-
level policy implementers; and (2) a series of effective measures by the 
National Team that have mediated the tension between the National Team 
and provincial teams and reconciled their interests, eradicated provincial 
boundaries, and benefited swimming development in a broader range of 
provinces.  
    First, there were innovations regarding the National Team system at the 
Beijing Olympiad; the most notable example was the introduction of the 
concept of the ‘Big National Team’. Previously, the National Team was in 
charge of only recruiting swimming talent from provincial teams and managing 
the National Team. Following the ‘Big National Team’, the National Team, to 
some extent, transcends the top-down hierarchy between the National Team 
and provincial teams by fully taking advantage of provincial resources 
including facilities, scientific support, coaches and young talent, and by 
including these talented swimmers and coaches in the broader scale of the 
National Team. Pre-eminent young talent of provincial teams can be directly 
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recruited to the National Team irrespective of age.44 The concept of the ‘Big 
National Team’ integrates domestic resources more effectively and 
transcends provincial boundaries. Coaches of one provincial team (coaches 
serving the National Team also work for their provincial teams) are often in 
charge of swimmers from different provinces. Thus, provincial rivalry has been 
ingeniously transformed into inter-provincial support, and an atmosphere that 
provincial teams fully consider and respect the interests of the National Team 
has been gradually formed.45 Moreover, the National Team has become more 
active in communicating with provincial teams and absorbing the young 
swimming talent of provincial teams. The most salient example is the 
collective training for reserve swimmers organized by the Aquatics 
Management Centre and the National Team since the Beijing Olympiad.46  
    The collective training, generally held three to four times annually, 
congregates almost all young talented swimmers and coaches from provincial 
teams. Coaches of the National Team guide young coaches and swimmers. 
In the collective training for reserve swimmers, provincial teams are divided 
into several large groups, each of which contains several provincial teams 
from both Northern China (whose team members are generally deemed more 
adept physical training) and Southern China (generally considered more 
proficient at skills). Teams in the same large group, including coaches and 
athletes from different provinces, follow a unified plan and train together. More 
importantly, these innovative measures have unified the interests of the 
National Team and provincial teams. In addition to its contribution of many 
world-leading swimmers (e.g., Olympic champion Shiwen Ye) and some 
Olympic gold medal coaches (e.g., Guoyi Xu and Haitao Liu, the coaches of 
the Olympic champions Shiwen Ye and Liuyang Jiao, respectively), 47  the 
collective training for reserve swimmers has also helped with the progress of 
lagging provinces such as Henan and Anhui because of the deliberate policy 
bias regarding venue selection.48 The home team can send two coaches and 
eight reserve swimmers to the collective training compared with one coach 
and four reserve swimmers for non-home provincial teams. 49  This 
demonstrates the Aquatics Management Centre’s deliberate policy of 
improving the overall development of swimming nationwide.  
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    The head coach of the Chinese National Swimming Team is appointed by 
the Aquatics Management Centre,50 but the appointment must be approved 
by GAS.51 Coaches of the National Team also ‘belong’ to their corresponding 
provincial teams and lead them in major domestic competitions such as the 
National Games.52 However, as noted, when they fulfill roles for the National 
Team, according to the concept of the ‘Big National Team’, coaches are often 
in charge of athletes from different provinces because coaching transcends 
provincial boundaries. This relatively flexible coaching structure is conducive 
to both the National Team and provincial teams.  
    The contribution of provincial resources to the National Swimming Team is 
also illustrated by the geographical breadth of training bases. In addition to 
Beijing, there are training bases for the National Team in Hangzhou, Dalian, 
and other locations in China.53 To improve the aerobic capacity of swimmers 
on the National Team, since 2006, many coaches have taken their swimmers, 
to the Duoba National Plateau Sports Training Base in Qinghai Province, or to 
the base in Kunming, Yunnan Province for annual high-altitude training.54 The 
duration is normally 4 to 5 weeks each time.55  
    Finally, in the case of the Olympic Games, scientific and medical staffs from 
provincial teams may join the National Team to support some key swimmers 
such as Yang Sun and Shiwen Ye.56 This is an additional demonstration of 
the integration of provincial resources to serve the National Team in 
swimming.  
 
A Vanguard in Globalization: ‘Invite In and Go Out’ 
 
Chinese swimming is widely accepted as an illustrative example of the 
globalization movement of Chinese elite sport.57 As the leading sports team in 
conducting a long-term ‘Invite In and Go Out’ strategy,58 the Chinese National 
Swimming Team has been committed to the recruitment of foreign coaches 
and overseas training. The trigger was the non-gold performance at the 2007 
Melbourne FINA World Championships. This poor performance, from 
Kingdon’s (1995) perspective, was a policy window prompting major reforms 
in coaching, which was identified as a culprit, or problem from the perspective 
of the multiple streams framework. Subsequently, the Director of GAS – Peng 
 16 
Liu promoted four points including the recruitment of high-level foreign 
coaches and the organization of key swimmers for overseas training in 
leading swimming countries. 59 Thus, GAS-level political leader’s role as a 
policy entrepreneur prompting the National Swimming Team’s recruitment of 
world-leading foreign coaches and the expanded overseas training was 
evident. Foreign coaches and overseas training became two most notable 
outcomes in the policy stream. Training with Denis Cotterell (the coach of 
Grant Hackett) since 2007 helped to improve Lin Zhang’s performance AT 
Beijing 2008, where he became the first Chinese male ever to win an Olympic 
swimming medal.60 The Chinese National Swimming Team has maintained 
cooperation with Denis Cotterell and regularly sends key swimmers including 
Yang Sun to Australia for training. The contract with Denis Cotterell does not 
specify any goals, but Denis Cotterell and other foreign coaches such as Ken 
Wood are financially rewarded by the Aquatics Management Centre and the 
National Team for Olympic gold medal performance. 61  Denis Cotterell 
occasionally visits the national training base in Beijing to guide swimmers of 
the National Team. The cooperation with leading foreign coaches and the 
‘Invite In and Go Out’ strategy were continued and the recruitment of foreign 
coaches was strengthened after London 2012.62  
    As early as 2006, the Chinese National Swimming Team began sending 
top swimmers abroad for overseas training, but training in the United States 
was unsatisfactory. 63  The Management Centre and the National Team 
learned lessons and concluded that overseas training should be more 
targeted and selective, and that training destinations should have world-
leading facilities, coaches, and swimmers. 64  The first major breakthrough 
occurred after Lin Zhang’s cooperation with Denis Cotterell after Melbourne 
2007. Lin Zhang and Peng Wu’s successes consolidated the Aquatics 
Management Centre and the National Team’s determination to continue 
overseas training. The Aquatics Management Centre has expanded individual 
overseas training to large-scale collective group overseas training since 
2010,65 a process referred to as the ‘modern self-strengthening movement66 
of Chinese swimming’. 67 The vast majority of the National Team regularly 
travels abroad for overseas training, and Australia has become the main 
destination. 68  The Chinese National Swimming Team sends a group of 
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athletes to Australia each year for training that generally lasts 4 to 6 weeks. 
Olympic medal favourites go to Australia twice a year. In addition to Australia, 
the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom are also destinations for 
overseas training.69  
    Consistent with the ‘Invite In and Go Out’ strategy, the National Team has 
sent key swimmers to Hong Kong Polytechnic University for rehabilitation.70 
Moreover, the team invites experts from Hong Kong for long- and short-term 
scientific support.71  
 
Clear Strategic Plan and Step-by-Step Quantified Performance Targets  
 
A clear, feasible, and detailed strategic plan has been another contributory 
factor underpinning Chinese swimming’s notable progress in the aftermath of 
Beijing 2008. This was a recent development at the London Olympiad, 
triggered by the reflection of the limited progress on home soil in Beijing 
where Chinese swimmers had won only one gold medal, and was led by the 
new national team head coach and the team leader,72 who played the role of 
policy entrepreneurs in this case. However, they were internal entrepreneurs 
inside the Juguo Tizhi (the whole country support for elite sport system) rather 
than exogenous non-governmental advocates, because head coach and team 
leaders are also sports officials enjoying administrative power and status in 
elite sport in China. Also, as noted above, centre directors, team leaders and 
leading coaches dominate the policy agenda and decision making of the 
National Swimming Team, with the evidence of influence and intervention 
from the general GAS level (mainly GAS officials and political leaders) in the 
case of more fundamental issues. Therefore, there is very little evidence of 
the influence of policy entrepreneurs outside GAS and Aquatics Management 
Centre, although it would be overstating the matter to say that there is no 
evidence of policy entrepreneurs outside the government machinery. 
Sponsors, despite their substantial financial contributions, are prohibited to 
participate in decision making and internal affairs of the National Swimming 
Team, as clearly stated in the sponsorship contracts 73. Media criticisms can 
pressurise the National Swimming Team, but rarely has this type of criticisms 
and suggestions been adopted by the Aquatics Management Centre that is 
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primarily accountable to the orders and principles of GAS (government). 
There are occasions where scholars are involved in the decision making in 
the forms of meeting attendance and advice consultation74. However, the 
centre director, vice director, team leader and head coaches hold the final 
decision making power.  
    Step-by-step, or rather, year-by-year quantified medal targets were a 
dominant characteristic of the Chinese National Swimming Team’s strategic 
plan in the post-Beijing 2008 era. According to the London 2012 Preparation 
Plan, the Chinese National Swimming Team’s objectives were as follows: 
• 2009: To win at least three gold medals at the 2009 Rome World 
Championships; 
• 2010: To beat Japan at the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games; 
• 2011: To achieve additional breakthroughs in pivotal events; 
• 2012: To achieve gold medal breakthroughs in men’s events and to 
outperform themselves at Beijing 2008 in women’s events at the 2012 
London Olympic Games. 
 
All these policy objectives were successfully met, while the overall 
competitiveness of Chinese swimmers gradually increased and reached a 
peak at London 2012 (Table 3). The notable gold medal progress at London 
2012 provided an optimal examination for proving the value of a series of 
approaches including the centralization of the National Team and the concept 
of the ‘Big National Team’ and the ‘Invite In and Go Out’ strategy. The 
cooperation with foreign coaches and overseas training, collective training for 
reserve swimmers, and quantified performance targets and evidence-based 
strategic plans were maintained and even strengthened in the aftermath of 
London 2012. Thus, policy windows can be opened by successful 
performance rather than a crisis. In addition, instead of policy termination and 
new policies, policy change is evidenced in the form of policy continuation and 
strengthening. It is also clear that in the context of elite sport, major sporting 
events in particular the Olympic Games acts as a periodical examination for 
most sports in a wide range of countries (e.g., elite swimming in China in this 
article) and the performance at the Olympic Games often largely influences 
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policy direction and the necessity of policy change in the subsequent 4-year 
cycle. This demonstrates the predictability of certain types of policy windows 
in certain contexts. Thus far, China has maintained its competiveness in 
swimming at the two World Championships at the Rio de Janeiro Olympiad.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
There is evidence of policy convergence from China’s quantified performance 
target identification. This approach echoes UK Sport’s ‘No Compromise’ 
strategy 75  and Australia’s recent Sports Tally – performance-contingent 
funding strategy, promoted in Australia’s Winning Edge: 2012–2022. 76 Finally, 
it is pertinent to mention that Japan has been a major rival and comparator for 
Chinese elite swimming in Asia. A competition result with Japan often forms a 
valuable indicator for measuring China’s performance, leading to performance 
review and policy change in some cases – for example, the 2000 Sydney 
Olympic Games and the 1998 Bangkok Asian Games.77  
  
Leverage of Competitions 
 
Competitions were identified by GAS as crucial for delivering China’s elite 
sport excellence, explicitly stated as early as in The Outline of the Strategic 
Olympic Glory Plan: 1991–2000.78 The 2001 Moscow decision to award the 
right to host the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing and the ambition for success 
at the 2008 Home Olympic Games provided a powerful impetus to the 
refinement and further development of the domestic competition structure in 
China. Domestic competitions’ role as a domestic platform for and ‘rehearsal’ 
for the Olympic Games became increasingly salient, with the functions of 
which comprising athlete and coach identification, athlete development, and 
the familiarity with the rules of Olympic sports. Although the National Games 
of China, as the most high-profile domestic multi-sport competition in China 
and the ostensive Olympic Games for provincial teams, 79 has been Olympic-
standardized (regarding sport, discipline and event setting and Olympic rules; 
the only exception is the inclusion of the traditional Chinese sport of Wushu) 
since the 1997 Shanghai National Games and the ‘policy medal’80 approach 
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was adopted even earlier in 1993, there were further developments in the new 
century focusing on greater success at Beijing 2008. Since the 2005 Jiangsu 
National Games, an Olympic gold medal has been counted as two for the 
home province at the National Games and an additional gold medal has been 
conferred on the National Games if the champion breaks a world record 
according to the principle specified in 2008 Olympic Glory Action Plan.81 
    For many coastal provinces and municipalities, the performance in 
swimming largely determines or, at least, influences their positions in the 
medals table. For example, at the 2013 Liaoning National Games, Zhejiang 
Province won 35 gold medals and ranked seventh in the medals table. 
Swimming contributed 25 gold medals to the delegation, accounting for more 
than two-thirds of the total gold medals that Zhejiang won. However, only 15 
gold medals were actually won during the National Games because the 
remaining 10 gold medals were ‘transferred’ from the 2012 London Olympic 
Games.82 These transferred gold medals are referred to as ‘policy medals’. A 
double-point system was also adopted for athletes representing the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) team according to which both the home province of the 
PLA athlete and the PLA team win a medal at the National Games if the 
medallist represents the PLA team.83  
    GAS adopted this medal calculation method as part of its strategy for 
implementing national policy to coordinate regional interests more effectively 
with those of the national teams, thereby enabling provincial sports teams, 
which prioritize the National Games, to serve GAS goal of Olympic success. 
This policy secures provincial teams’ morale to serve the national team’s 
priority of Olympic gold medals. Furthermore, the Zhejiang swimming boom in 
the past decade is a clear manifestation of the GAS adoption of the policy 
instrument of incentives and inducements.  
    Swimming-specific competitions’ leveraging role is equally discernible and 
they are increasingly instrumental in contributing to athlete cultivation. The 
National Swimming Champions Competition (in the first half of a year) and the 
National Swimming Championships (in the second half of a year), both held 
annually, are the two most crucial swimming-specific domestic competitions.84 
They are fully exploited by the Aquatics Management Centre to provide 
provincial teams with incentives to invest in the development of swimming in 
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general and to improve certain events in particular. The most salient example 
is China’s recent progress in the men’s 4×200m freestyle relay.  
      On the final day of the National Swimming Champions Competition, all  
      the best 16 swimmers in the men’s 100m freestyle and  
      men’s 200m freestyle events are assembled. They are divided by lot into  
      four relay teams for a star relay competition. This measure is purposive  
      policy support for men’s freestyle events and has led to more  
      substantial support for men’s freestyle at the provincial level. Several  
      world-class male freestyle swimmers have emerged from this  
      competition.85   
                                                                      
Anti-Doping: From Ignominy to ‘Zero Tolerance’ despite ‘Fluctuations’ 
 
Chinese National Swimming Team, particularly the Women’s Team, markedly 
improved at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games and dominated the 1994 
Rome World Championships. However, the team experienced a nadir 
between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, and large-scale drug use was 
the main culprit. 86  Notably, the eruption of doping incidents was closely 
related to the recruitment of former East German coaches and medical staff.87 
The policy learning and transfer from East Germany led to nightmarish 
consequences. Moreover, the use of drugs disseminated by many East 
German coaches to their swimmers reflected the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
bottom-up implementation theory.88 These doping incidents, most notably the 
scandals at the 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games and the 1998 Perth FINA World 
Championships,89 were the most notorious doping scandals in Chinese elite 
sport history, and have had a profound impact on not only Chinese elite 
swimming but also the entire Chinese elite sport domain. 90  The overall 
competitiveness of Chinese swimming was vastly eroded. 91  These two 
humiliating scandals, officially identified as ‘subversive incidents’ in Chinese 
swimming history, 92  became the catalysts for GAS and the Aquatics 
Management Centre to take strict measures to crack down on drug use. Thus, 
China became one of the first countries to adopt blood tests in 1999.93  
    The poor performance at Sydney 2000 further consolidated the Aquatics 
Management Centre’s determination to eradicate drug use. For example, the 
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Aquatics Management Centre and the CSA promoted a policy including 
regulations stating that registered athletes are ineligible to participate in the 
National Games until two years after the registration, and registered athletes 
must compete in at least two competitions annually; that swimmers not 
participating in the collective training organized by the National Team are 
ineligible to represent China; and that athletes found guilty of drug use can 
never return to the National Team and will receive a long-term ban.94   
    The approaching of Beijing 2008 accelerated the development of anti-
doping in China. The establishment of the China Anti-Doping Agency 
(ChinaDA; affiliated with GAS) in 2007 was a milestone, signalling China’s 
determination to combat doping.95 Regarding swimming, in addition to general 
anti-doping codes of the World Anti-Doping Agency and ChinaDA, the 
Aquatics Management Centre and the CSA have required registered 
swimmers to provide non-competition whereabouts and have increased the 
frequency of out-of-competition tests since 2005.96 ‘A zero tolerance’ policy 
has been adopted, which was exemplified in the Aquatics Management 
Centre’s lifelong ban on Kunpeng Ouyang, approved by GAS. 97  The 
establishment of a regular National Team enables strictly tracking and 
detecting whether key swimmers use a banned substance. In addition to the 
tests conducted by the World Anti-Doping Agency and ChinaDA, swimmers 
who regularly train on the National Team have been required to take weekly 
blood tests since 2008. 98  These stringent measures on anti-doping have 
created a healthy environment for Chinese elite swimming and the number of 
doping cases has dropped considerably over the past 10 to 15 years. To 
summarize, the policy windows for anti-doping policy development in Chinese 
elite swimming included (1) notorious scandals at Hiroshima 1994 and Perth 
1998; (2) poor performance at Sydney 2000; and (3) the approaching of 
Beijing 2008 and the concomitant pressure from GAS, domestic and 
international media and the general public. Some windows, in particular 
Chinese elite swimmers’ notorious incidents in 1994 and 1998, have left a 
profound impact on anti-doping movement in China the imprint of which has 
transcended elite swimming per se.  
    However, despite China’s notable progress in anti-doping between the 
Athens Olympiad and London Olympiad, there is a widespread suspicion 
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across Western nations that Chinese elite swimming success is still reliant on 
doping. In particular, doping again became a puzzling issue confronting 
Chinese elite swimming since the Rio de Janeiro Olympiad. The National 
Swimming Team was widely accused of its late report of Yang Sun’s doping 
cases in 2014. In addition, Beijing’s anti-doping laboratory was suspended by 
the World Anti-Doping Agency in early 2016. More recently, a doping incident 
plagued Chinese swimming at Rio de Janeiro 2016, which again brought 
China’s inadequate anti-doping activities into the focus of global media.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
China’s dramatic progress in swimming in the aftermath of Beijing 2008 was 
not achieved immediately. It has been the product of a series of policy 
approaches adopted after the nadir at Sydney 2000. Its policy trajectory in the 
past 15 years could be aptly illustrated according to Kingdon’s (1995) multiple 
streams framework. 99  First, the aforementioned policy developments in 
Chinese elite swimming must be understood within the wider political and 
economic contexts of a single-party political regime. The governmental policy 
agenda in China represent the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology, 
longstanding governmental support for elite sport, increased political salience 
and concomitant heavy policy, financial support for elite sport and in particular 
elite swimming after Beijing’s successful Olympic bid, and an Beijing-2008 
centred pro-elite sport national environment as well as China’s economic 
surge, resource boom, and accelerating pace of globalization. The policy 
developments have formed the political stream. The problem stream has 
comprised not only poor performances at Sydney 2000 and Melbourne 2007 
(in addition to limited gold medal progress relative to other sports at Athens 
2004 and Beijing 2008), but also the performance pressure and expectations 
derived from the hosting of Beijing 2008 and Shanghai 2011, as well as a 
series of successes since Rome 2009 including Shanghai 2011, London 2012, 
Barcelona 2013, and Kazan 2015. These events also acted as policy windows 
prompting policy change and policy strengthening at various critical junctures. 
Policy windows were opened by Chinese elite swimmers’ ‘examinations’ at 
various international major events most notably performance declines at 
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Sydney 2000 and Melbourne 2007. However, prominent events beyond 
swimming and even beyond elite sport (i.e. Beijing’s successful Olympic bid in 
2001, China’s entering of the World Trade Organization; WTO) have also left 
an indelible imprint on elite swimming in China by shaping and shifting its 
pathway. Concerning doping, notorious large-scale doping scandals at the 
1994 Hiroshima Asian Games and the 1998 Perth FINA World 
Championships were also defining moments prompting the development of 
anti-doping policy in China; hence, these moments were also policy windows 
for anti-doping for the entire Chinese elite sport landscape. Through the 
largely internal (GAS, the Aquatics Management Centre and the National 
Swimming Team) discussion, review and reflection, problems including a 
loose national team structure, the low quality of training and coaches, the lack 
of a global horizon, the limited power of the national team, the lack of 
cooperation from provincial teams, the unbalanced swimming development 
between different provinces, the lack of scientific support, and the prevalence 
of doping were identified, and accordingly, a wide range of policy solutions 
were advanced and implemented. Crucial policy solutions, or approaches 
mainly included elevated policies, financial and scientific support through the 
landmark 119 Project, the adoption of a centralized approach to the national 
team, measures taken for improving national–provincial relationships and 
eradicating provincial segmentation most notably the establishment of a ‘Big 
National Team’ and the organization of collective training for reserve 
swimmers, the appointment of new key leaders, the commitment to ‘Invite In 
and Go Out’ evidenced in notable developments in overseas training and the 
cooperation with leading foreign coaches, a clear strategic plan and the 
adoption of a quantified performance target system and a series of measures 
strictly for combating doping. Because of the top-down relationship with GAS 
and the largely ‘hermetic’ decision making process and the centralization of 
decision making power, there is no evidence of the influence of policy 
entrepreneurs outside GAS and the Aquatics Management Centre. There is a 
high degree of overlap between influential decision makers and entrepreneurs 
of the afore-mentioned policies; namely, key political leaders of GAS, political 
leaders of the Aquatics Management Centre (centre director, associate 
director) and the National Team (director of the team committee, team leader, 
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and key coaches including the head coach and Olympic gold medal coaches). 
Policies have been influenced by the notable progress and relatively stable 
international performance of Chinese elite swimmers since 2009, as well as 
the improved national–provincial relationship, burgeoning of talented young 
swimmers and coaches, and the lack of doping incidents at recent 
international competitions. Table 4 presents a summary of the development of 
elite swimming since 2000 from the perspective of the multiple streams 
framework.  
(Table 4 about here) 
 
Despite its strong pluralist foundation, the multiple streams framework 
provides a valuable lens for analyzing elite sport policy in relation to swimming 
in China. The concept of policy windows has proved to be particularly useful 
and helped identify pivotal events and actions following policy responses to 
such events in the development of elite swimming in China.  
    Although the multiple streams framework in general and the 
concept of policy windows in particular is useful in directing attention 
to problems and the policies that they prompted, there are distinctive 
features of elite sport in general and elite swimming in particular that 
necessitate some adaptations and localizations in the context of elite 
swimming in China. This research suggests that the three streams are 
not necessarily independent of each other. Although policy windows 
may accelerate the coupling of the three streams, China’s sport policy 
including swimming-specific policy approaches (the policy stream) is 
well interiorized within the nation’s unique pro-elite sport government 
(synonymous with the CCP party) philosophy and political system (the 
political stream). Concerning the problem stream, as evidenced in this 
article, problems often act as an agent prompting the opening of policy 
windows, or in many cases, form the policy windows. Therefore, this 
article, similar to many recent studies, challenges the mutually 
independent nature of the three streams, originally argued by Kingdon 
(1995). At least, the degree of this independence tends to vary 
according to different political systems and policy domains.  
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    For policy windows, the scale of policy windows advanced by Kingdon 
(1995) tends to be oversimplified and hence it needs careful specification.100 
Exworthy and Powell’s (2004) categorization of ‘big windows’ at the national 
level and ‘little windows’ at the local level provided this thesis with 
inspiration.101 In this thesis, policy windows are divided into big windows’ and 
‘swimming-specific windows’. Examples of the former include China’s joining 
the WTO and increased pace of globalization, as well as the success of 
Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games. Concerning swimming-specific 
windows, poor performances often became ‘wake-up calls’ for actions and 
change for corresponding sports. Hence, it is apparent that policy windows 
can be coupled at different levels; for example, evidenced in the confluence of 
the poor performance at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games and Beijing’s 
successful Olympic bid in 2001, and the impact of the confluence on the 
introduction and acceleration of the implementation of the 119 Project.  
    Another concern regarding policy windows is their predictability, which has 
been most systematically illustrated by Howlett’s (1998) categorization of 
routine, spillover, discretionary and random windows.102 Policy windows are 
highly predictable in the area of elite sport policy. As noted, performances at 
major international competitions often opened a window for either policy 
change or policy continuation and consolidation. Although the detailed results 
or the outcomes at the Olympic Games, for example, have tended to be 
unpredictable, the 4-year cycle of the Summer Olympic Games has commonly 
led to regular and routinized general and sport-specific reviews and 
summaries. The Olympic Games has become a regular examination of 
Olympic sports in China, including elite swimming and the policies for the new 
Olympiad, whether in the form of policy continuation and development or 
substantial policy changes, which are often contingent on the performance at 
the Olympic Games and the evaluation. The performances at the World 
Championships and Asian Games have also provided periodic smaller-scale 
examinations of elite swimming policies. Furthermore, poor performance often 
opens a policy window for policy change, as evidenced in the overseas 
training in Australia and cooperation with leading Australian coaches, 
prompted by China’s non-gold performance at the 2007 Melbourne World 
Championships.  
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    The final issue is closely associated with the ‘inertia’ of some polices 
discussed in the policy stream section. As noted, some polices are not 
established immediately and some policies tend to be long lasting. The 
gradual adoption, consolidation and continuation and development of some 
policies, as evident in the development from tentative overseas training and 
cooperation with foreign coaches to the large-scale and regular overseas 
training and import of world-leading foreign coaches of Chinese swimming 
demonstrate that some polices are not completed ‘within’ one policy window. 
Instead, they are developed more incrementally way, typically involving more 
than one policy window covering a certain time span. This demonstrates the 
incremental and cumulative nature of some policies through several policy 
windows.  
    Finally, as in the discussion of the problem stream, policy windows can be 
opened by events other than a crisis or events in the political stream. Chinese 
elite swimmers’ recent success since Rome 2009 raised its performance 
expectations and concomitant pressure. This pressure could be identified as a 
policy ‘problem’ that requires, at least, further actions and developments of 
existing policies, if not new policies. Policy windows can be opened by 
positive events (the raised bar effect) rather than by a crisis in the problem 
stream.  
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